Op Sindoor: The myth of a ‘free hand’

On numerous occasions since the pausing of Operation (Op) Sindoor, military leaders have intoned that the political leadership imposed no ‘restrictions’ and gave a ‘free hand’ to them for its conduct. For good measure, the brass hats added there was ‘political will’ and ‘political clarity’ in the directions they received.

Air Chief AP Singh’s version given out in the Katre Memorial lecture, has it that, “(T)here was very clear political will, very clear political directions given to us and there were no kind of restrictions which were put on it…. If there were any constraints, they were self-made. We the forces decided what will be our rules of engagement. We the forces decided what will be our escalation ladder that we want to ride on. We decided how we want to control escalation. So, I want to make it very clear, there were no, I repeat, no restrictions on us. Full freedom was given to us to plan and execute.”

Theory holds that at every level of command ‘terms of reference’ are communicated to the recipient of directions and orders. If these are not made explicit, these are eked out by the recipients from the context of the situation, by thinking through the commander’s intent.

By this yardstick, the Air Chief claims the military figured the political echelon did not want India to be arraigned as ‘aggressor’, and therefore, the military initially left out targeting the Pakistani military. The Air Chief attributes such calibration to maturity of the Services.

In the event, this misreading proved somewhat costly in terms of platforms for the Air Force. Accountability is warranted. Does it rest with the military or the civilian side?

The prime minister had gone public with the political aims, characteristically using the Pahalgam tragedy to kick off his Bihar polls’ campaign, where he thundered, and in English at that, “(T)oday, from the soil of Bihar, I say to the whole world: India will identify, track, and punish every terrorist and their backers.”

In his later confabulations with the brass, a dissipation of belligerence can be detected in his stating, “it is our national resolve to deal a crushing blow to terrorism.” By the time push came to shove, ‘backers’ had been sensibly excised from the list.

Instead, Op Sindoor was ‘conceived to punish perpetrators and planners of terror,’ with the limited aim to ‘destroy terror infrastructure,’ a language allowing for the initial sparing of the Pakistani military. Patently, a political restriction was placed on the military.

The CDS has admitted as much, saying, that in ‘spasht shabdon’ the political leaders had okayed strikes with the caveats being that these are only on terrorist-related targets (‘atanki thikanon par hi nishana lagaya jaega’) and that Pakistan’s military establishment will not be targeted (‘Pakistan ke military establishment ko nahin target kiya jaega’). The Pakistani military was to be taken on only if they retaliated.

That the Air Force did not represent against the tying of its hands by the ruling out of suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) proved telling. The military’s misreading of the terms of reference is cover for its diffidence in pushing back, perhaps because of being overawed by the outsized image of the political leadership.

It proves the proverbial ‘absent dialogue’ persists in Indian civil-military relations. For this the political leadership must take responsibility. Instead it is using the military to displace blame away from itself, and characteristically at that.

During the post Uri surgical strike, the prime minister admitted to wanting all men back across the Line of Control by day-break – hardly a terms of reference that lends itself to success. At Balakot, that the regime prevaricated is clear from the prime minister - and the air chief separately - ruing the absence of Rafales, putting into question the damage touted. At Galwan, the refrain famously was ‘no territory lost.’

On the non-military side is the vanishing act during Covid II, which these days is painted up as a Vishwa Guru act. Mr. Modi’s visit to Manipur after two years – and to little avail – is another self-explanatory case.

In the instant case, the restraint persisted in face of aircraft losses, with both military and foreign ministry channels offering Pakistan an off-ramp within an hour after the pounding of terror hubs on Pakistani mainland.

Therefore, for the military to say that no restrictions were placed is to cover up. Doing so is a political act, only worsened by the military’s taking on the responsibility onto itself.

The military knows the importance of legible information to a democracy. This is especially pertinent when the regime is abusing military’s subordination for its political purpose, as is its wont.

An official press release has the defence minister stating that, ‘immediately after the attack, PM Modi held a high-level meeting, and the Armed Forces were given the freedom to take decisive action keeping in mind discretion, strategic understanding and regional security situation (italics added).’

The three caveats are far too generic and are not all solely in the military’s remit, instead are in kitty of the national security edifice. Here, the ‘all of nation’ approach, vocalized by the military, was in evidence. The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Chauhan has an elaborated on the ‘bahut bada yogdaan’ of the national security adviser (NSA) in his speech to a saffron outfit.

The CDS credits NSA Doval with ‘spasht faisle and margdarshan,’ ‘laksha ka chunao,’ ‘target selection,’ ‘sainya bal ka prayog,’ ‘kab, kitna, kitni quantity mein,’ ‘napi-tuli sateek,’ ‘non-escalatory tarike se karna,’ ‘deescalation ki niti aur tarike’ and ‘koo-niti ka prabal ka prayog.’ (My translation: ‘clear decisions and guidance in respect of aim, target selection, use of military force including on when, how much and in what quantity, measured and precise application in a non-escalatory manner and with de-escalatory policy and measures and the employment of information techniques.’)

Apparently, the military profited from the NSA’s advisory input in line with restrictive political stipulations. The only intriguing aspect of this is the CDS’ mention of ‘decisions’ of the NSA, when the NSA’s is, as his title suggests, an advisory role. Were legitimate reservations on limitations on SEAD voiced to the NSA for decision?

The proximity of Chauhan with the national security edifice – in which he was an adviser in his previous appointment – can be expected to have provided a seamless intercourse. The Air Chief in his lecture lauds the CDS’ synchronization role. Perhaps, the CDS brought the NSA’s input to the Chiefs of Staff Committee table, of which he is permanent chair.

Even so, dissonance can be detected in the forces’ narrative on Op Sindoor, with the Air Chief and the CDS diverging on the detail. Obscuring of roles, responsibility, relationships and boundaries allows avoidable scope for alibis from accountability. The ‘free hand’ alibi is for scapegoating the military.

Firstly, the CDS’ description of the NSA’s oversight reveals the extensive interface between the civilians and the military. Notable is the thrust to dampen any impetus towards escalation and the emphasis on de-escalation. In short, the civilian thrust in Op Sindoor was towards reducing its scope, both at the political (ministerial) and grand strategic (official) levels. This brought about the ambush on the first night, which then forced India to hold out for getting in a decisive blow.

That it didn’t prove escalatory owes to American intervention with Pakistan (more later). In any case it was a close run crisis, with informed observers concluding, ‘(T)he combination of strikes on nuclear-related military infrastructure and third-party disinformation risked turning a conventional conflict into a nuclear crisis.’ In short, hype and rhetoric in favour of muscularity is just another instance of political profiteering from Indian military showing.

Secondly, contrary to the regime’s posturing is its gingerly approach to the use of force. This, despite a foreign military analyst invited to gauge the actions taken ‘emphasised the depth of preparation behind the operation, citing months of wargaming, intelligence fusion, and pre-positioned defence assets.’

This brings into question whether and to what extent was Pahalgam a Pakistani ‘trap,’ as a general famously put it. Instead, India was ready to go, knowing a terror incident would not be long in coming after the terror on a train incident in Balochistan and Munir’s infamous fulminations in its wake. Such a conflict environment avoidably places the nuclearized subcontinent at the mercy of intelligence games between the two sides.

Thirdly, it is too early to say whether the Indian pummelling led to Pakistani throwing-in the towel. It may well have been in keeping with their commitment to the Americans to desist from a tit-for-tat, extracted previously. Wisely persisting with their commitment for wider strategic reasons has seen them receive handsome recompense. If the Pakistanis had been tempted to get the last laugh, then they’d have incurred Trump’s ire, as India seemingly has. This prompts speculation whether the magnitude of the Air Force’s last punch was intended to unhitch the Pakistanis from their commitment to the Americans.

Lastly, with the crisis cut short rather messily by a Trumpian tweet, the regime has had to over-compensate to refurbish its image with its constituency of ‘raitas and trads’. Modi’s decree that in future India ‘will not differentiate between the government sponsoring terrorism and the masterminds of terrorism,’ betrays a distinction was indeed made this time round.

Though wise, the regime’s distancing from it indicates it is dangerously hostage to its own image. Op Sindoor now turning out to be India’s ‘forever war,’ in imitation of its strategic partners - American, Russian and Israeli - it could prove just as bad for India.

Accountability for the outcome in a endangered-in-perpetuity subcontinent must be attributed to the nature of civil-military relations, in which the Services appear too timid to take up pertinent politico-strategic (remember Ladakh), operational (Op Sindoor’s opening salvo) and structural (Agnipath) matters with the regime. The responsibility to undo this rests with their civilian political masters.