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Toting up legacies of two generals poised to fade away

Two generals are in their legacy period: General Chauhan just handed over the chief of defence staff baton, while General Dwivedi is doing his farewell rounds. Both have been around at a consequential time operationally and in terms of developments in civil-military relations. A look at what they leave behind is timely, though the last word on either cannot be pronounced just yet.

The lucky general

General Chauhan’s retiring a second time round is a notable first. This is the second precedent he sets for his successor, General Subramani. It seems that the route that’s proved lucky for both – through the national security council secretariat as military adviser to national security adviser (NSA) – serves to ideologically vet and socialize CDS candidates. General Subramani took care to reference the ‘honourable prime minister’ in his inaugural address to the press.

Despite this advantage, General Chauhan’s legacy can be summed up in one sentence: Just prior to demitting his chair after some four years and one extension, General Chauhan sent up a proposal on theaterisation to the ministry. Presumably in his prior billet as military adviser, he’d have been privy to the thinking of both, his regimental mate, General Rawat as CDS, and of ethnic kin, Ajit Doval as NSA. Yet he was left out in the cold; yet another case of political abdication and attempt at firing from uniformed soldiers, which in this case at least turned out a blank.

If anything must be laid at Chauhan’s door, it was his inability to goad on his mentor, the NSA, and political master, the raksha mantri. Even that is not so much his personal cross to bear as much as commentary on the military’s heft in the national security system. That said, till the ministry pronounces on the recommendations, his legacy cannot be figured out in full; and in the event, credit - if any - will be shared by his successor if he can pull it off in his tenure.

Since General Chauhan had command authority only over a few fledgling outfits (notably the Strategic Forces Command takes its marching orders from an unelected civilian, the NSA), it’s his first-among-equals position as chair of the chief’s committee on which his showing must be gauged. He can be credited with limiting Op Sindoor, given that it had non-military objectives at the outset; included a peaceful outreach when underway; and was stopped promptly, once the air force got even. The last he may have to share with Trump! Even so, the political leadership thought it prudent to consult some veterans too on the last evening, betraying either goose bumps or under-confidence in the uniformed leadership.

A good thing was the CDS admitting to losses suffered in the air, albeit doing so on foreign soil and somewhat economically for a democratic country. A bad thing was letting pass the targeting of the Nur Khan air field, though the escalatory potential of such adventurism was known prior, particularly since he himself is an acknowledged nuclear expert and is the military adviser to the nuclear command authority.

As the deterrent value of Op Sindoor remains uncertain, no definitive acclaim can be accorded. Given that Op Sindoor persists as Op Sindoor 2.0, it is clear that Op Sindoor itself is a self-acknowledged failure of the regime. Therefore, if it was at all a strategically sustainable step is questionable. That it resulted in the limbo of indefinite duration dubbed the ‘new normal’, shows up a deficit in strategy making, attributable directly to NSA Ajit Doval. Given that the regime already wants to walk back from the posture – with its backers calling for talks with Pakistan - is a telling commentary on myopic strategy making. As principal military adviser to the raksha mantri, the general must have had a say; so, must bear with his share of the scrutiny. However, domestic political aspects having more to do with it – keeping Pakistan in the doghouse is good for keeping Indian Muslims on the backfoot, both together constituting the Other in the regime’s world view - General Chauhan can be let off, but not wholly.

A lasting impact of his tenure is in his introduction of the concept of fusion into the discourse and in practice. Though the concept is nothing new, it caught steam on General Chauhan’s watch. He went a step further aping China in recommending that the military and defence stakeholders be ideologically convergent. With no clarity on the ideology he had in mind or whether he was referring to a work ethic or a patriotic sentiment, it cannot out-rightly be said that he was only plugging atmanirbharta. A danger is that fusionism, though visualised as securing and enhancing civilian stakeholder participation in national security, may well turn out the other way round, it being a two-way street; for instance, military involvement in moving competitive exam papers about!

The less lucky general

There is precedence in a serving chief not making it to CDS. General Naravane – by his showing in handling the Chinese and in being sceptical on agnipath - had perhaps ruled himself out of the running. General Pande retired when the CDS post already had an incumbent. For now, coup-proofing concerns and a continuing continental mindedness rule out sister service nominees for CDS. Therefore, General Dwivedi not making it is comment-worthy: a four-star chief is thought not fit, while his own three-star vice chief retiree is. The only thing distinguishing General Subramani from the competition is the ‘soldier-scholar’ tag; which arguably suited his last appointment better, considering that its first incumbent was also dubbed likewise.

Ordinarily, the Chief ought to go down in history for enabling at long last a structural innovation envisaged two decades back. He has overseen the raising of integrated battle groups, which would allow the land war component to take the battle to the enemy. With the army restricting itself to stand-off fire assaults and air defence in Op Sindoor, it felt the need to fast-track a capability to launch conventional limited attacks, which at the next crisis could help it respond in quick time to either a terror atrocity or the adversary’s upping the ante.

However, the General’s last verbal scrum with Pakistan – on nuclear portents of a conflict - suggests that while the intention of war limitation is there, there is little confidence in it. Since this is a work-in-progress, the final word on the measure – whether it proves an escalatory first step up the proverbial ladder or a slip into a morass – can only be kept in reserve.

It also has another underside: that the army is not quite lacchak – for want of an apt word - enough to respond to crisis outbreak. It intrigues as to why the army needs tailored forces when its units and formations should be able to combine into employable forces in a reasonable time-frame. To do away with what weighs the army down, such as ‘bull’ and superfluous housekeeping, appears not to have been explored. For now, he can only be known for keeping up the din on Op Sindoor.

Chiefs are expected to be political savvy enough to serve as an institutional guiding light. In General Dwivedi’s case, it is cannot be said with any certainty if he is complicit with the regime’s political project or merely lax. The former is not unlikely, given his - soundly criticized - move of replacing the painting in his office on the 1971 victory with one depicting a fantasy battlefield, the notable feature of which is a saffron-clad figure directing military forces.

Distressingly, the figure has since been reproduced elsewhere, most strikingly in the headquarters of the more consequential of operational commands. At the photo-op site at its headquarters – that lately witnessed the American ambassador pose - the backdrop has a looming statue in precisely the same commanding posture as the one in the painting, overshadowing the Chakra and the full-length profiles of the nation’s two field marshals. The figure depicts Chanakya, with the hall bearing his name.

It is to invoke an imagining that the armed forces go to battle along lines thought up by a strategically-minded national security establishment. It indicates the fusionism the military desires, in which a whole-of-nation approach to national security is directed by a political body with access to Chanakyan counsel: materializing the motto of the defence staff college: ‘to war with wisdom.’

Notwithstanding this, the symbol can well instigate an alternate imagining in light of a caste-infused social reality, in which a brahmin orders kshatriyas about. The military cannot be party to the conditioning that goes into social reordering, through making such symbols unremarkable. If an unwitting participant, the military is still liable to be called out – as here.

In salute

To be sure, both generals were reputedly fine human beings. General Chauhan also lived simply, going by the manner his cottage gate at the center of Lutyen’s Delhi has not been ‘done up’ with public monies as that of other brass-hats. This is not a factor to be dismissed lightly in a milieu that has decidedly coarsened. Both retained and demonstrated character qualities instilled by their common alma-mater, the academies. General Dwivedi just made his last visit to his squadron, proudly handing it the academy banner for topping the league table.

It bears reminding that they have weathered the most challenging era in terms of civil-military relations, geopolitical quakes and regional conflict outbreaks. It cannot be said with any conviction that anyone else could have done any better. The nation owes the two much for managing their political masters while keeping the family silver relatively intact.  

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/military-leadership-shape-of-the?r=i1fws

Military leadership: Shape of the lineup ahead

The regime is by now well known for its disruptive decisions. Appointments of military leaders is an area where such ‘masterstrokes’ have been successively visible.

The first was supersession by General Rawat of two of his able seniors. While one of these sported a Muslim name, the other was felled by a whisper campaign by men in shadows.

The second time round, it was when Rawat was to be accommodated beyond his sell-by date. A Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) position was created, but only conveniently after retirement of the then chair of Chiefs of Staff Committee, hero of the Balakot operation.

The third time was when Rawat’s untimely demise left a vacancy behind. Since the regime didn’t want Army Chief General Naravane elevated, it procrastinated on rekindling the post. That the regime’s stonewalling on Naravane’s memoirs shows he was too independent-minded for its liking.

Waiting out Naravane, eligibility for CDS was revised beyond belief to include three-star officers, along with retirees from that rank below 62 years. This brought another ethnic kin of Ajit Doval, General Anil Chauhan, then holding an advisory position under him, to the post.

Naravane was replaced by General Pande, an engineer officer, a first for a non-combat arms officer to tenant the top army post. An earlier engineer contender - with a Victoria Cross to boot – had been felled by Indira Gandhi.

In turn, less than a week before his due date for retiring, Pande was given a month’s extension for no apparent reason. His retiring on time could still have seen the next senior, his vice chief, General Dwivedi, step up – which was in any case done a week after the 2024 election results.

What the army chief had to do with the results or the aftermath is uncertain, but appears a consequential factor for the regime. This factor therefore must inform any consideration on baton handovers.

Now, the regime has extended the tenure of the CDS till he gets to 65. There may be two vacancies coming up, if General Dwivedi’s services are not taken further. He retires a month after Chauhan.

This allows for two ‘political appointees’ – in the ‘deep selection’ system adopted by the regime that opaquely ferrets out those with an ‘ease of doing business with.’

Notably, the tenure of the two selected will take the regime up to the next elections, a factor the regime thinks, matters.

While the CDS’ uniform could be of any of the three hues, here I dwell only on the chances of olive green.

Ironically, the onus will be on these officers to preserve what’s salvageable yet of the military’s apolitical character. Now that ‘ideology’ – like-mindedness – is no longer a dirty word, this is a tall order.

The regime has taken cue from Mrs. Gandhi, who placed a fellow Kashmiri Pandit in the chair, setting the stage for the Emergency. In the event, General Raina stayed immaculately neutral. (I look to read what Srinath Raghavan has to say of this.)

A retiree from the vice chief’s chair told me that when he arrived in Delhi, he was advised by insiders to make himself more in evidence to circles that matter by making the right noises (on television?) and meeting the ‘right people.’

A distressing spectacle can be expected with brass-hats jockeying till the announcements of the change-over, mostly left to the last minute. Another regime departure being short-circuiting not only of procedure, but also timelines.

Sadly, the sorry spectacle seems to have commenced in anticipation of the CDS’ turn-over at his three-year mark. In the event, the extension of tenure of the CDS made this a premature start. Shuffling out the CDS at this juncture would have robbed the celebratory aftermath of Op Sindoor of any credibility.

The senior army commander today retires earlier. It appears his gaffe – under circumstance of the times - of alluding to the now historical ‘apolitical and secular army’ is unforgiven. Now, paraphrasing the Chetwode dictum – in his otherwise somewhat innocuous interview – cannot resurrect his chances.

He held that nationalism must be the first religion of a fauji, followed by the religion of the troops served with, and one’s own coming last. Such reification of the nation sounds suspiciously like how the Hindutva mothership, the Sangh, would have it, conveniently collapsing the ‘first’ and ‘second’ religions into one.

This, despite the general noting earlier in the interview, where he discusses Havaldar Abdul Hamid’s martyrdom, that it is a sense of duty (‘dharma’ if you will) that drives fauji endeavour.

The focus thus shifts to the next cohort. Of the two from this batch (full disclosure: my joining-up batchmates from academy), one demonstrated his secular credentials, while the other gifted a ‘horrible’ memento to the visiting defence secretary. Notable is that it is unusual for the august civil servant to be visiting a command headquarters in first place, and that to, to discuss ‘operational preparedness,’ a subject outside his domain.

The second at a conclave gave out prepared answers to what appear to be questionnaire shared prior, taking great care to quote the usual hon’bles; ‘hon’ble’ dating in the military lexicon to the onset of the regime.

Its no wonder that grapevine maintains the second, Lt Gen Dhiraj Seth, is frontrunner. Son of a general and former governor appointed in the ruling party’s turn-of-century incumbency, it would be churlish to envy him his silver spoon; even if ‘nepo-kid’ is now a jibe.

But, realistically, the influence of dining-table conversations cannot be elided. Recall General Seth, as Governor Chhattisgarh, was empowered by the state’s scheduled status to preserve it from the likes of Salwa Judum, that took shape in his time at the rajbhawan, but the rest is history.

Military common-sense has it that all at senior three-star level are deemed competent to take on four-star responsibilities. How do the competitors stack up?

Other than the frontrunner, all others, in keeping with their generation’s lot, have operational experience. I have personally seen one coolly look over the parapet to spot where incoming fire was from so as to direct resources appropriately. Another was a fire-breathing one-star commander on the Line of Control. Another led para-commandos. An army commander picked up a Sarvottam medal for Op Sindoor. Another is a gallantry awardee.

For the frontrunner to lack on this score is curious, when a prescient army chief from the armoured corps, General BC Joshi, had catered for blooding of all officers, throwing open cross-postings of mechanized forces’ officers with infantry units and raising the Rashtriya Rifles.

True, strategic level command requires a different skill set, which presumably all reaching three-star rank are endowed with. General BC Joshi himself was one such with zero operational experience. Also true, a wide-angled vision is usually in short supply with commanders from the Kashmir cauldron. Imagine if BiRa had not pipped Praveen Bakshi at the post!

While expertise on the western front – as the two contenders from the mechanized forces have – will be useful in Op Sindoor phase II, it would be wiser to cater for the more significant, China front. By this yardstick, the dossiers of the two from the next batch gain traction (full disclosure: friends from my passing-out batch).

Such professional yardsticks might escape the regime. It is shortsighted enough to repeat the electoral gimmick of plucking out Rawat from the line up to influence Uttarkhand elections then at hand.

Next year, the one in Uttar Pradesh (UP), slated for the following year, will be nigh. At least three contenders belong here. This has semblance of a policy of ‘stacking’ (the Hindi-Hindu-Hindustan policy’s bias towards the Gangetic plains favours increasing number of officers from this region).

The new vice chief, incidentally from UP, moved without first heading of a field army. While not without precedent, it is a premature exposure to the underbelly of the defence sector, unless it is to be only a penultimate move. Should he make it to four-star, it would be a first time for a non-National Defence Academy product; a factoid of interest to a regime set on setting precedents.

As to whether the contenders stick by their oath to the constitution at the crunch – next elections – depends on whether professional military education at the higher ranks makes recipients appropriately politically alert.

They spend a year at Tees January Marg, keyed into strategic discourses. Yet, the jury is out if political sensitivity imparted translates into prudence or acts as impetus to bandwagon.

While the military apex has the potential to deliver on the military’s professional mandate, erring on the side of caution is advisable on the inevitable political tunic to their job.

Since the regime itself believes the miliary is critical to managing potentially sensitive outcomes of elections, it would likely make its selections in this light, especially so when of late election outcomes are being increasingly questioned.

Note: With thanks to unnamed former colleagues for improvements in the first draft.