https://thewire.in/security/why-rajnath-singh-talks-defence-strategy-and-religion-together

Strategic culture: Rajnath Singh tests the waters on next steps

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Speaking as the ‘yajman’ (‘chief patron of religious rituals’) at the second anniversary of the Ayodhya temple consecration, India’s defence minister, Rajnath Singh, said, “Ram is humble. Ram is virtuous. Ram is compassionate. But where necessity arises... Ramji takes on the role of vanquishing the wicked there as well. During Operation Sindoor, we worked under that same inspiration of Lord Ram.” For him and his colleagues in the Cabinet Committee on Security to draw on their shared cultural wellsprings during Op Sindoor is unsurprising.

At the event, Singh was present in his personage as Raksha mantri. He prayed, “May this flag of Sanatana Dharma continue to fly as long as the sun and the moon endure. May Lord Ram guide us all on the path of duty.” This is a natural corollary to cultural nationalism subscribed to by Singh. Rajnath Singh legitimates such subscription, thus:

No social movement is born suddenly from zero. It emerges from the consciousness of society, grows within society and takes shape while changing itself according to the changes in society. And when the movement progresses, it determines the direction of society. The temple construction movement has also been such a movement which not only shook history, but also gave direction to the present and laid the foundation for the future.

There are three higher-order problems with such formulation. One is the proximity it betrays of state and religion; the second is the partisan role of the state in the contested space of religion in a diverse society; and the third is implications for rationality and modernity that an anachronistic uptick in religion implies. Instead, here Singh is met at his own level.

When humility, virtuousness and compassion are notable in their absence from the regime’s repertoire, its claims to being inspired by a deity cannot be taken at face value. It shows instead the appropriation by political Hinduism – cultural nationalism - for legitimation of a bellicose turn to strategic doctrine. The changed visual depiction of the Lord - itself a step succeeding the makeover of widely loved Lord Hanuman – presaged this. As for the ‘movement,’ it stands forever tainted with the demolition of a mosque and a judicial sleight of hand that handed it the proceeds of its handiwork. Whether such a shady start can or should secure the future direction of society is debatable.

This is of a piece with Rajnath Singh’s belief system, which holds that, “Lord Ram is not merely an embodiment in stone, wood or soil, he is the centre of our culture and faith.” To him, “Lord Ram is our identity as well as that of our country.” The primacy of religion as identity carries significance for the ongoing (re)shaping of Indian strategic culture. Given the stranglehold the regime has acquired over all institutions, not least over those in the domain of national security - including lately the military - the regime cannot but be expected to pitch for strategic culture’s evolution in a certain direction. Hardly organic, the illegitimacy of this impulse must not be missed.

Strategic theory visualises three hierarchical platters in strategic discourse. The upper platter is somewhat amorphous, comprising the national ethic or ideology informing strategic doctrine or approach to the use of force. The second platter consists of guidance, the somewhat diffuse defence policy and military doctrines. The lowest platter has the tangible products: grand strategy and strategy. A hierarchical layering ensures pathways and guardrails are provided by the higher, prolix layer for the next lower, progressively more concise layer. Together and over time, these ideational tracts - along with implementation outcomes - shape strategic culture.

Strategic culture defined loosely is the historically-informed attitudes to power and behaviour of a nation in regard to the use of force. The location of the national ethic at the apex of the process makes it a consequential piece. Miscuing it potentially renders askew the whole strategic edifice. The debate in India over absence of strategic products – as the national security strategy - owes to the contestation over the national ethic. The Constitution - that drew on the ideals of the freedom movement - has mostly served for convergence in thinking on national security. However, witnessed in the Modi era is an attempt to lend an authoritative stamp on the national ethic, riding on the back of religion.

This owes to the unacknowledged political project furthered by the regime. There is a duality at play. While the Constitution is bowed to at one side, it is surreptitiously shredded at the other. The security domain - relied on by the regime for legitimation and sustenance - cannot escape such a game-plan. The harnessing of strategic culture to the regime’s purpose is yet another measure towards such an end.

Strategic culture is being constructed afresh through official diktat in the regime’s image. With a self-regard of being strong-on-defence it is eking out vignettes and aphorisms from ancient texts on India’s martial grandeur, seen by it as having been eclipsed for the past 1200 years. The regime is seeking Kautilyan thinking as revetment for its security policies. Barring exceptions, Bollywood has also largely been sequestered in its manufacture.

This is unexceptionable in itself, since the regime can well pitch for an assertive strategic doctrine and condition public sentiment accordingly. Afterall, its detractors back the robust counterpoise that has historically rivalled Chanakyan thinking, the Ashokan security perspective that prevailed through vast tracts of Indian history and geography. In this debate between ‘shanti and shakti,’ the problem is when gods are invoked to lend ballast to the regime’s preferred strategic doctrinal choice.

Referencing religion – as Rajnath Singh attempts - implies that the regime wishes not merely to steal a march over its opposition, but to outpoint them in perpetuity. Since the majoritarian game-plan does not necessarily have in mind the shaping of the external security environment as much as the domestic, this is fraught. Therefore, the parallel political project cannot be lost sight of in appraising the strategic field in India. Scholars are liable to arrive at anodyne appraisals of strategic culture if the duality is not sufficiently appreciated.

Singh makes evident the regime’s favouring of an ideology-driven national ethic. While cultural nationalism can and will influence the national ethic, it cannot supplant the Constitution. Only a Hindu Rashtra could anchor a national ethic in Sanatan Dharma. For now, doing so will elide the necessary consensus. The electoral verdict clipping the regime’s wings was on the basis of its gunning for the Constitution in the event of an ‘abki baar, char sau paar.’ The distancing by the seers from the spectacles at Ayodhya signifies the illegitimacy of the regime’s political project. Simply put, the ‘movement’ is not quite the place to rummage about for the national ethic.

As befits an democratically obedient military, the military has rightly addressed itself to constructing a strategic culture in line with an assertive strategic doctrine. Notwithstanding civil-military fusion, the mentioned upper platters of the strategic process are largely civilian mandated and must be politically-led. Rajnath Singh’s trial balloon – there was no ministry press release on the remarks – shows up potential next steps in reconstructing strategic culture. The military would be wise in not mistaking reiterations as marching orders. As the military drafts its vision document – part 1 is due out soon – it is hopefully wary of the regime seeking to fire from its shoulders

https://m.thewire.in/article/caste/why-the-indian-military-cant-ignore-questions-on-representation-anymore

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How right is Rahul Gandhi on the Indian military and ‘the 10 per cent’?

Recently Rahul Gandhi held that 10 per cent of India’s population has control of the military, saying, “They (forward castes) have control over the army…And the 90% population (the rest) — you will not find them anywhere.”

While he may be wrong in the details, he is right - if prematurely so - on the essentials, since the ‘control’ is a work-in-progress, set to culminate when Agnipath changes the complexion of India’s army.

The Agnipath scheme is designed to get two birds with one stone. It has in its sights a deflation of the ‘martial races’ and ethnic groups of marginalized communities that have been advantaged by the class proportions (single or fixed) incident in some regiments.

The Agnipath scheme enables a rewind to the halcyon days of the purabiya sepoys, when forward castes formed the mainstay of the army prior to the upheaval of 1857. It will also re-affix the martial races into their place lower down in the social pyramid, while reinserting the marginalized back at the bottom.

The capture is incipient

Ideally, a federal polity of an ethnically diverse democratic state ought to have equitable representation from all its constituent regions and communities. Though India has been well served by a democratically subordinate professional military thus far, for the army to reflect India’s diversity would only be healthy into a fraught future.

For now, there is a regional, ethnic and religious imbalance in numbers within the army. On this the Agnipath scheme, now facing its first turn-over in inductees of four years back, only flatters to please.

Agnipath moves the recruiting paradigm from ethnically based recruiting to an ‘all India, all caste’ system. This undercuts the advantages the communities with an ethnic-based pass into the army had, either as so-called martial races or the carve outs for the marginalized groups, who were also accorded space within the army, such as Muslims, Ahirs, Mazhabi Sikhs and Mahars.

A second feature of Agnipath, brought in after its advent, is that the recruitment process now features the written test being taken by candidates prior to the physical tests. This advantages educationally forward communities, while downgrading the prospects of those traditionally signing up to the military in whom brawn supersedes much else.

The lack of diversity

Regional diversity is only of token proportions. It is well known that north India is well represented while the south and east are under-represented. Of the 331 commissioned in June 2023, 153 were from the cow belt, while only 28 were southerners. Curiously, of 11 from the north east, 8 were from Arunachal. It’s the relative absence of marginalized ethnic and social groups from the military that is concerning.

As for religious diversity, the relative absence of Muslims in relation to their country wide presence and proportion in the wider population is example. The numbers of Muslim officers once used to be at two per cent. The latest combined merit list for the National Defence Academy and the Naval Academy has 7 Muslim in a list of over 700. Since the two academies would at best take in some 500, merely 4 would likely make it gauging from their ranks obtained, which makes for all of 1 per cent.

Before Agnipath created an unthought-through problem for Nepalis in the army, Nepali Gorkhas were double in number than India’s own Muslims. Clearly, when the army declined to share numbers on the Sachar committee’s request, it was but hiding an embarrassing reality.

In terms of caste, fine-grained figures are unavailable. Reasonably, castes answering as warriors that include ‘martial races’ such as the Rajput, Sikhs, Dogras, Marathas and Jats are well represented. To these communities can be added a smattering of the upper rung of Other Backward Castes, such as Yadavs.

The onset of the Agnipath undercuts the ‘martial races’ by threatening the regimental system. The deliberate obfuscation by the national security adviser on this question indicates eventual of evolution of the regimental system away from its ethnic rootedness.

With their respective proportions withdrawn, these communities would require banking on the showing of their youth in the common entrance tests. This will likely dilute their numbers, that were otherwise protected under the regimental system.

Another outcome will be the already negligible numbers of marginalised communities getting fewer.

But for a regiment having a fair percentage of Muslims from that region, Muslim numbers are negligible. Likewise, the Mahar regiment only incidentally boosts figures of Scheduled Caste presence. As for the Scheduled Tribes, but for the Bihar, Assam and Naga regiments, their presence too would be truncated.

Added to this must be the situation in the central police forces and the paramilitary. Even the Assam Rifles – sentinels of the North East – has a large proportion in its ranks of groups not from the North East. The central police forces tried increasing the presence of Muslims, but only momentarily. Today no records are released on such data, so it can be assumed that the situation of marginalized and minority group presence is rather low.

Only incidentally, some groups have been inducted, such as Naga hostiles being taken into army ranks from counter insurgency purposes. Likewise, some renegade militants were taken into the ‘home and hearth’ units of the Territorial Army and others into the hatchet wing of the Kashmir police. The numbers of Ladakhis in uniform went up after the Kargil War with Ladakh Scouts attaining regiment status. An effort to induct tribal communities from Central India is also on, but has counter insurgency motives as impetus.

Under the new recruiting process, those with better educational access gain an advantage, while those from peasant classes and rural areas - the mainstay of soldiery so far - and the educationally backward communities – who are likely more robust physically - are liable to be left behind. The new-found need for a tech-enabled work force busts the earlier logic that high altitude deployments necessitated a younger, more robust profile in the soldiery.

A political consideration

That a federal democracy must have a military reflecting its diversity appears a no-brainer. What’s certain is there is no conscious policy on diversification flowing from a belief that a composition reflective of the lived reality in India would be healthy for democracy.

Absence of numbers in the open domain restricts logical, reasoned and credible consideration of this vexed question. The higher purpose of maintaining India as a federal democracy and making it more socially equitable requires security forces to be open to scrutiny.

The military will claim it is not in national interest to reveal such numbers. It would cite the potential for such numbers to become a political football. Taking the military’s reservations onboard, the exercise can be kept in-house, either in a blue-ribbon commission or closed-door sittings of the relevant parliamentary committee. This governments record of ‘surgical strikes’ on the nation, that included Agnipath, indicates that an off-the-radar consideration is possible.

If the impending caste census were to keep security forces out of its purview, it can only be a sub-optimal exercise. The monies that go into the security sector in terms of pay, pension, perks and privileges, will flow to communities advantaged by the Agnipath scheme. It would serve to strengthen their position in the caste pyramid. A more equitable spread – what the caste census is intended to bring about - calls for holistic stocktaking.

Given the regime’s propensity to support ‘control’ of the military by the ’10 per cent’, there is a need for a concerted thrust to broaden its recruiting profile to include all regions and communities. Current conditions of educational deficits in most communities as against the forward caste advantages preclude ‘All India, All Class’ and meritocratic dogmatism.

Scope for state or district-wise reservations – as indeed is historically the case with the Indian army – needs to be built in. Indeed, grapevine has it that even as the regimental system is tinkered with, it might yet retain some of the proportions of martial classes; which shouldn’t surprise since they also stand second in the social heirarchy as the warrior class.

A narrowed catchment area is undesirable in country of continental size in terms of population and landmass. The aim must be to eventually erase the concerning and unrecognized reality of ‘stacking’ in India, wherein, of some 750 districts over 80 per cent of recruitment is from just over a 100 districts (impressionistic figures).

An undesirable political implication is that potentially a particular political ideology might find its way into the military if the mainstay of recruiting is from the Gangetic belt, where such ideology holds sway.

Alongside, ahead is also a likely dwindling in political power of regions as southern India brought on by a post-census delimitation of parliamentary constituencies. This would weaken any counter balancing heft of the south within the military. A north-dominated military would also constrain the south in maintaining an ethnic balance of power across the subcontinental landmass.

An operational implication is in regard to the military’s showing in internal conflict situations. Prejudices – such as the islamophobia fanned by politicos – can only have a baleful affect. The popularity within the military and the veteran community of the notion that the surgical strike on Article 370 was altogether a good thing is a case to point.

Rahul Gandhi gets it right

To dismiss Rahul Gandhi’s statement cavalierly is par for the thrust and parry of politics, intended to deny him credibility in keeping with the ‘pappu’ canard.

Understandably, the military’s political master does not want to put his hand into what promises to be beehive. However, the military would do well to introspect. If it does not course correct autonomously, it would only prove the point that Gandhi makes, that it already stands corralled by a certain ‘10 per cent’.

An internal inquiry getting to grips with the data is the start point. While its right-wing inclined veterans will likely raise a ruckus as the caste count looms, the military would prove befitting of a democratic state if it furnishes its figures for informing the caste census.

The claim that it has no records on religion is hogwash. How else does it know if it has to bury a member or place a body on a pyre? It must realise that one among the ninepins, it cannot but fall, as have others listed by Rahul Gandhi, “... only 10 per cent of the country’s population (i.e., the ‘upper castes’) get opportunities in corporate sectors, bureaucracy, and the judiciary....”

A reckonable outcome is desirable given the current-day discussion surrounding inequality. Social and economic inequality is already self-evident. Political inequality is set to grow, in case inability to control population growth is rewarded with parliamentary seats.

What currently appears as Gandhi’s tilting at the windmills requires a holistic broad-front approach. Holy cows as the corporate sector and the military cannot be ‘left out of battle’ on the major political question in the life of the Republic.