Tuesday 9 November 2021

 https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/21095/Incipient-Shift-in-Civil-Military-Relations-

Incipient Shift in Civil-Military Relations ?

UNEDITED VERSION

A problem from hell in India’s civil-military relations

A recently-released monograph, collectively authored by a set of liberal intellectuals, India’s Path to Power: Strategy in a World Adrift, carries a section on ‘Politicisation of the military’. The paper has it that there is an incipient shift in the apolitical characteristic of the Indian military. The military brass needs to fight a rearguard action, lest the military too fall along with other institutional ninepins.

The paper apprehends that, “the traditional apolitical stance of the military is under pressure at two levels: the first, of the senior military leadership, and the second, comprising the junior leadership of officers and persons below officer rank.” Whereas the rank and file is susceptible to the change in wider society towards majoritarianism, the senior leadership is under pressure from the rightward thrust of polity.

With regard to the former, it observes a conflation in the mind’s eye of senior military leadership, between the government and the State. This disrupts the traditional distinction between loyalty to the Constitution and the ruling party. As for the latter, according to it, there is an “assault on the secular outlook of the armed forces by wider social and ideological currents.”

It prognosticates that the political masters are likely to continue to ride military horses to electoral victory, in light of precedence of partisan dividend. The government has also taken to ‘deep selection’ of senior military appointments. Even though it is a legitimate process, pliability or like-mindedness could overshadow competence.

Though spot-on in diagnosing a looming problem, the paper – perhaps for reasons of space – is light on the remedy: “This issue is a matter for the military leadership to introspect and rectify.” It believes that the onus for keeping at an apolitical distance from pernicious politics devolves on a military leadership seized of the motto, “Service Before Self”.

It is unlikely that the paper’s recommendation that the military brass stand up and be counted on this score will find traction. There is a pattern of intimidation followed by the government, such as of the liberal media and personages taking a skeptical stance.

This will likely to deter any such thoughts on part of the military brass. It does not have to go as far back as the instance of sacking of an admiral by a previous right wing government, but the nasty information campaign of petty corruption against the general who led the pack when this government made its first deep selection, picking the third in line for army chief.

Curiously, on the continuing necessity of an apolitical military, the paper says, “This responsibility on the military leadership is huge because India is a nuclear power.” It does not elaborate on how India’s nuclear weapon state (NWS) status attenuates the apolitical military characteristic that predates the NWS status.

Even so, it is worth reiterating the questions that animate the section and to try answering them: Is an apolitical military needed, and, if so, how can this be ensured?

India, though continuing as a procedural democracy, has been recently termed an ‘electoral autocracy’. A putatively authoritarian polity can do without an apolitical military. An apolitical military is required when there is alternation in government of different political parties. The political project of this government requires it ensconced in power till the majoritarian turn to polity it not complete.

In such an endeavour, the ruling formation, termed the ‘Parivar’, requires the military as a subordinate ally. Compliance is facilitated by the military being enthused by the ethno-democracy in-the-works or swayed by a populist political leadership. Both thrust-lines for a docile military are at play.

The former is a work-in-progress, with no dearth of trying. Soon, the military curriculum is to be injected with a dash of inspiration from ancient India. The concept of an apolitical military is a throwback to the fifties, when the military sociology theory in the West dwelt on how to subordinate the military in a democracy. Today, how Indian tradition has it on issues as the relationship of the chakravartin with the senapati and place of the military in state craft - perhaps elucidated in tracts as the Arthashastra - matters more.

As for the latter, the prime minister has long sought occasions to vibe directly with troops, with his Diwali visits to frontlines being a prominent vehicle for such insertion into their consciousness. In his latest interaction with troops on the Line of Control, while thanking them for the execution by the army of surgical strikes, he brought out his abiding concern with their safety when the strikes were being conducted. The brass has evidently taken cue. A general recently approved an obsequious tweet on his formation’s twitter handle greeting the prime minister on his birthday, only to later withdraw it.

Taken together, the two thrust-lines imply that nurturing an apolitical military is not necessary in New India. The problem that arises, as pointed out in the paper, is, “a danger of a pliable military leadership being used for narrow party-political purposes at the cost of national interests.”

Illustrations of such a principal-agent (government-military) relationship are in the cover-up, with the military complicit, over Balakot and the Ladakh intrusion. The military’s sub-par performance is overlooked by political masters in return for the military keeping the reality – embarrassing for political masters - under wraps. The price of such mutual back-scratching is in national security.

Another illustration is Kashmir, where, in not calling out the obvious aggravation of the problem in Kashmir that accrues from the political high-handedness - specifically evacuation of Article 370 of all meaning - and security force heavy handedness, the military furthers an inaccurate picture of success. While there is no call that this be done in the open domain, there are no reports of the military thumping the table in dissent even at the discussion stage.

The military’s lending of its credibility to preferred narratives of the government helps absolve the government of democratic accountability, thus compromising a vital national interest: democracy. The military ends up playing a political role to the partisan advantage of the ruling party, unwarily ending up party to the slow-motion dismantling of liberal, Constitutional democracy.   

This is easy for the military to miss when, as the paper points out, “(C)ontemporary political and popular discourse routinely conflates the government with the state.” The military is victim of such conflation too. This reveals a blind side to its professional military education.

If and since the lacuna advantages the ruling party, the political masters are unlikely to be concerned. The military is also unlikely to righting the tilt, since it might put it at odds with the political masters. Besides, who will bell the cat? The opposition cannot be too vocal on this score, lest it drag the military into the political bull-pit. Strategic commentators can at best caution the national security establishment to advise political masters on a course correct.

The danger is in the problem culminating in the next national security crisis if in the interim till next elections. That these have a nuclear overhang explains the otherwise curious underlining in the paper of the nuclear factor as compelling civil-military relations remain on even keel.

 

 

 


Wednesday 3 November 2021

 https://www.newsclick.in/is-military-brass-transgressing-diplomatic-LAC

Is the military brass transgressing the diplomatic LAC?

On 27 October, at a function at the Budgam airfield re-enacting the landings on the same date in 1947 for saving Kashmir from the invasion of kabailis, the chief of the Air Force’s Western Command expressed the hope that Pakistan occupied part of the erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir state of Maharaja Hari Singh would be part of India someday.

While delivering the first Ravi Kant Singh Memorial lecture series’ talk, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Bipin Rawat, in relation to Chinese inroads in India’s neighbourhood, said that, "(S)uch attempt and adventure in the neighbouring countries would go against India's national interest and these are potential threats to India's territorial integrity and strategic importance." Almost as if India is not already at it, he went on to note that, “we have to … assure neighbours that we are their permanent friends and we want to engage with them on equal term (sic),” and that, “(W)e need to be able to convince them that we will be your friends in the long term.” 

Late last month, the army vice chief, speaking at a seminar, opined, "(I)f Tibet had strong armed forces, they would have never been invaded." Apparently, he was underlining the necessity for a nation to have strong armed forces. Not naming a country referred to as ‘a big nation’, he claimed, "(T)oday everybody talks about India as the net security provider and it is a security umbrella against a big nation."

From the three illustrations above, it is clear that this plain-speak by the brass on the wider-than-narrowly-military aspects of national security is a trend, or, in officialese, not an ‘aberration’. Coming in quick succession, the statements point to a policy decision to have the brass give voice to matters beyond the narrowly-military pale.

It is not as if the foreign office has not gently pushed back. When the infamous ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis acquired a new subscriber in the CDS, just when the two foreign ministers of India and China were to meet on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation gathering of foreign ministers last month, no less than the foreign minister had to step in to contain the fallout by distancing India from the general’s words.    

However, there has been little public skirmishing on the continuing inroads the brass seems to be making into diplomatic turf. Can it be inferred that the brass has been selectively empowered to participate, if not take the lead, in national security relevant messaging?

Perhaps the coordination on this score rests with the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), so that the two branches of government and instruments of national security – military and diplomacy - do not step on each others’ toes and do not elbow each other in areas of inevitable overlap.

With theaterisation coming up and plurilateralism being the foreign policy mantra, for the military to get into higher gear visibly and bat at a higher than operational level is seemingly unexceptionable. Military exercises and exchange visits are now at a pace difficult to follow. The fledgling Department of Military Affairs (DMA) appears to have heightened the salience of the military within government and increased the scope of activity of the military outside the traditional domain of border guarding and counter insurgency.     

In regard to statements directed at China, the brass taking on an additional duty of strategic messaging gives the foreign office sufficient space to pursue a negotiated end to the continuing crisis. Besides, India perhaps wants to outgun the Peoples’ Liberation Army in its information war salvoes launched in media battles that have followed the fraying of relations between the two states.

As for Pakistan, even as the military presents an implacable front, the national security bureaucracy can continue its below-the-radar engagement, such as that brought about the Line of Control ceasefire and the recent invite to the Pakistani national security adviser to discussions on Afghanistan in Delhi. In any case, Pakistan is fair game since a hybrid war is ongoing, of which information war is a key domain.  

This is a positive interpretation of the new practice. However, the military has certainly gone beyond military diplomacy.

None of the eight bullet points on the ambit of the CDS and the DMA as given in the Second Schedule to Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules 1961 have anything to do with diplomacy. At best, it is the Department of Defence under the defence secretary that has a role beyond matters that are not strictly military, if the last bullet point in its charter (“Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, National Defence College and any other organisation within the Ministry of Defence whose remit is broader than military matters (italics added)”) is an indicator.

Therefore, the new-found practice begs the question of whence did it originate. There are three possible impulses.

The first is understandable, but only at a stretch. Given the recurrence of military forays into diplomatic terrain, it’s possible the military has been allowed greater leeway, with diplomats acquiescent. This strengthens India’s strategic profile and outreach, particularly since the Foreign Service has been long criticized for having too small a cadre to be able to punch at India’s weight.

The second – uncharitable - one is that these interventions stem from an autonomous, expanded interpretation of national security post creation of the DMA. The CDS has acquired a reputation for speaking his mind on national security. His alleged proximity with National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval perhaps emboldened him. Taking cue, his fellow generals are now more voluble, even in matters other than diplomacy.

The third - seemingly implausible but not impossible to visualize in an India that has seen its institutions been reduced to rump - is that an incipient turf war has been sparked off by national security minders. The resulting bureaucratic politics places them in the position of arbitrating. Could friction between NSA Ajit Doval and Foreign Minister Jaishankar have escalated to levels at which national security bureaucrats using the military to intrude onto diplomatic turf?

While the latter two impulses are obviously undesirable, even the first - a reasoned policy to use the military for sniping at neighbours - is not without its underside.

The underside can be seen through reasoning why China inexplicably intruded into Ladakh early last year. A possible reason could be that there was disconnect between what China was hearing at the informal summits at Wuhan and Meenakshipuram and what it was experiencing on the ground along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The then eastern army commander had said that the army’s transgressed across the LAC twice as many times as China, while General VK Singh put the figure at five times. With the military operating within its domain (patrolling the LAC) leading to a blowback, when it operates outsides its domain, blowback is virtually a certainty.

While military diplomacy does reinforce diplomatic firepower, the military brass shooting its mouth off is not quite military diplomacy. Even if a policy choice to allow the brass latitude, with diplomats onboard, the new found practice calls for review. If impelled by the latter two impulses – military expansionism or bureaucratic politics – then the need is even more so.  

 

 

 





Monday 1 November 2021

 https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/theres-a-political-opportunity-in-kashmir-will-the-centre-grab-it-7662811.html

There’s a political opportunity in Kashmir. Will the Centre grab it?

UNEDITED VERSION

Tweaking the ‘chronology’ opens up a political opportunity in Kashmir

During his recent visit to Kashmir, the home minister repeated his chronology on reversion to statehood of the union territory: delimitation and elections followed by statehood. However, reversing the order of the latter two can potentially renew the social contract, frayed since 1987, with Kashmiris.

The home minister’s visit set the stage for this best case scenario for the BJP. Apprehensions are that the ongoing delimitation exercise is to empower the Jammu belt, thereby enabling the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), stronger south of the Pir Panjals, take power for the first time in Srinagar. Statehood would be the incentive for ruling party-inclined voters, a promise easier met if the ruling party at the Center and the state are the same.

However, a political party view but one viewed through a parochial lens, in this case a right wing, ideological one. A national problem area as Kashmir should not be subject to a partisan approach. It needs leavening with input from governmental institutions involved to enhance the options, including other options.

To be sure, the delimitation does not by itself indicate that the chronology is a done deal. There has been no indication from the level of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) that alone can rule on a national issue as this. 

The last time the chronology was aired was at an all-party meeting this June chaired by the prime minister. Other political parties were against the chronology since they lacked confidence that statehood would be conferred in case a party or coalition other than the ruling party wins. The Center could renege. 

What this suggests is that elections on the heels of delimitation may not see active popular participation, particularly in Kashmir. Therefore, even if the BJP does come to power with a virtual walkover, it would not be a victory for democracy, but would be pyrrhic.

This needs pointing out by the national security establishment. It has long engaged with the Kashmir issue in light of its mandate to return stability in Kashmir. It has the institutional memory and analytical heft to discern the security implications by deploying its scenario building expertise to assess the options.

There are essentially three scenarios.

The first is status quo. As seen from the recent spike in violence, a seeming trajectory towards peace is subject to sudden reverses and geopolitical eddies, such as from the return of the Taliban to power in Kabul.

The second scenario is elevation of the union territory (UT) prior to the elections can be galvanizing. Elections to a state assembly rather than a UT one can potentially prove an inflexion point. It will be a vote of confidence in Kashmiris, interpreting their beloved term, ‘azadi’, to mean availing themselves of democratic freedoms.

Alternatively, and lastly, persisting with the chronology could lend ballast and longevity to the insurgency. Kashmiri disaffection could deepen with another opportunity for political ministration passed up. The recent controversy over Kashmiris cheering for the Pakistani cricket team is telling on levels of alienation.

The third scenario would imply continuing of the hard-line, though its limitations are obvious after six years of its implementation. It cannot serve indefinitely as substitute for political action. It can at best create conditions for adoption of a political approach predicated on political judgment and risk taking.

Of the three options, national security institutions must live up to their duty by being forthright with the political principal. While recommending an option may be out of their remit, they could emulate former President Abdul Kalam.

Raj Chengappa in his book, Weapons of Peace (p. 38), recounts that when Prime Minister Narasimha Rao at the fag end of his tenure was dallying over the nuclear test, scientific adviser, APJ Abdul Kalam, soto voce suggested that testing might have ‘political benefits’ for Rao. Congress was not quite on a particularly strong wicket in the elections that were soon to follow. In the event, Kalam was wrapped on the knuckles for his pains by Rao for stepping out of his domain of expertise and charter.

Taking cue, national security minders could perhaps step out of the straight and narrow and assay their national obligation. They must emphasise that on national security issues, political interests are not a determining criteria.

They must gently nudge decision makers towards the second scenario here – statehood preceding elections. They can soto voce point out that come 2024, quietude in Kashmir may bring unforeseen political dividend and perhaps a Nobel peace prize. Doing so is worth a wrap on the knuckles.


https://m.thewire.in/article/security/what-an-angry-generals-unwarranted-admonition-of-kashmiris-says-about-the-army-and-politics


What an Angry General's Unwarranted Admonition of Kashmiris Says About the Army and Politics


UNEDITED VERSION

Are generals speaking their minds or shooting their mouths off?

At an Army Management Studies Board (AMSB) seminar in Srinagar, the Director General, Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lieutenant General KJS Dhillon rhetorically inquired of the Kashmiri muslim community why the silent majority amongst Kashmiri muslims remained silent and did not protests recent killings of minority community members in Kashmir.

He cautioned that the not only will Kashmiris lose their right to freedom of expression for being selective on what they protest about but the term ‘Kashmiri’ might end up as a pejorative, quite like the term, ‘Paki’, used in a racist context.

To him Kashmiri muslims’ absence from the streets in protest against lethal attacks on their fellow Kashmiris of the minority faiths as ‘selective dementia’. Perhaps he meant ‘selective amnesia’, a more familiar phrase. Or - uncharitably – he may have meant ‘collective dementia’, wherein Kashmiri Muslims, maddened by prejudice, did not condole publically enough their wantonly killed fellow Kashmiri Pandits and Sikhs in this month’s spike of violence.  

The general’s plain speak is a departure from the standard in civil-military relations and cannot be allowed to go unremarked. True, precedence has been set by his boss, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Bipin Rawat, who has done so repeatedly over the years since his elevation to army chief. Since that is his trademark by now, it is somewhat normalised, perhaps leading to his subordinates taking cue.

The situation has come to such a pass in public affairs that the first thing that comes to mind in such instances is the question whether the dignitary making the remarks is to retire soon. With Supreme Court judges leading the way, could the military be far behind? Cynicism has it that personages facing a pensioner’s anonymity may be tacitly auditioning for a post-retirement sinecure.  

It is true the general is due to retire soon, commissioned as he was in 1983. Also true is that an earlier incumbent of the appointment he holds now serves as military adviser in the national security council secretariat. Incidentally, a claim to fame of the military adviser was that his view that demonetization would wipe out terrorism in Kashmir by drying up the hawala channels that got stone throwers on to Kashmir’s streets.

However, to give ‘Tiny’ Dhillon (‘Tiny’ alludes to his 6 feet 4 inches height) the benefit of the doubt, he may have been acting in his official capacity. After all, at the apex of the intelligence set up of the military, he may well be playing his part since info war is part of the intelligence domain. That he is practitioner of info war is evident from his twitter account being made operational just about when he took over as corps commander in Badami Bagh, coincidentally right before the Pulwama episode.

The intent appears to be to shame the majority in the Valley, Kashmiri Muslims, to register their disapproval of the change in insurgent tactics to terrorism by targeting innocent members of the minority community. In strategic thinking, this would help with deterring the minders of terrorists sitting across the Line of Control from ordering more such murders since it would set the majority – the sea – against the insurgents – the fish.

Apparently the general has moral authority since his last tenure of five served in Jammu and Kashmir was as commanding general in Badami Bagh. His profile on his twitter handle claims he ‘worked for peace in Kashmir in Chinar Corps,’ going on to state, ‘(N)ation first always and every time.’ The two statements together explain his going voluble on Kashmir, in Kashmir.

However, it bears considering if a principal staff officer of the CDS can make egregious statements in regard to an Indian community. Firstly, must be dispelled any notion of emotional connect between officials and their work with communities empowering them to air their subjective observations. At a stretch, generals in command in counter insurgency theatres can arguably have such a privilege as their mandate includes grappling with insurgency in a multidimensional manner. Others had best hold their opinions till they retire.

Also, in this instance, the notion of seeming entitlement with which the general makes his remarks needs deflating, based as it seems to be on the notion of an affiliation with Kashmiris for having served there and provisioning of security for them.

When the general was commanding in Badami Bagh, Operation All Out was in full swing. The state, rattled by the protests in the aftermath of the killing of Kashmiri icon, Burhan Wani, had set its security forces to go about killing militants with renewed vigour. The figures for years 2018 and 2019 are of zero surrenders. This was when those signing up were at best impressionable youth, not quite hardened jihadis. According to the general, their lifespan as militants was less than a year. Sans training and weaponry they could not have made credible insurgents. So, does a ‘take no prisonersapproach explain the figure of ‘0’ surrenders in years 2018 and 2019, followed by a meager 9 beginning only later in 2020, after the general had departed Srinagar for New Delhi? Though credited with having parents persuade sons to return to the mainstream, resulting in some 50 youth coming back ‘quietly’, this is unverifiable as the security of youth involved is at stake. 

As it turned out, Operation All Out was the preparation of the cake for icing that was to come. He lent his credentials of office and the dignity of uniform for the bit of drama that preceded the launch of the Modi-Shah assault on Article 370. Knowing that the voiding of Article 370 would set off protests, the security establishment needed to have Kashmir vacated off soft targets. The general went on primetime claiming that the army, finding an anti-tank mine with Pakistani marking on the yatra route, had uncovered a Pakistani plot to target the yatra, leading up to it being called off. White lies in way of national security being de rigueur, the general’s performance enabled India to blame Pakistan for the extensive crackdown that followed, even as India went about despoiling the Constitutional provision.

With no reasonable locus standi to make his remarks, the general’s AMSB lecture amounts to victim blaming - Kashmiris have borne the brunt of counter insurgency for some three decades now. Reminders of their ‘duty’ as a majority can willy-nilly be appropriated by interested forces as another stick – gaslighting - to beat them with.

Yet another stick is whatever Kashmiris may do, it would never be taken as enough. Kashmiri leaders have voiced their protest, even though the state has gone out of its way to marginalize mainstream politicians. In the ‘dirty war’, killings cannot all be attributed to terrorists. Of those killed this month, two allegedly innocent Kashmiris have been killed by security forces, who command immunity, and one jailed Pakistani was killed while scouting for - or being used as a human shield by - the army chasing terrorists south of the Pir Panjals.  

Equally, the state has failed Kashmiris by keeping the conflict alive indeterminately, allowing for right wing experimentation with solutions as the dissolution of the state. It bears asking when the measure was at the discussion stage, what was the army input from its operational level commander in Badami Bagh?

Also, now that statehood is to be restored, but only after elections, has the DIA – lead in formulating the threat perception for the military - indicated the security implications of the chronology of the elections: delimitations, elections and only then statehood? The ongoing legislative constituency delimitation exercise is to shift the balance of seats in favour of Jammu region, making it easier for the Jammu belt so advantaged to vote in the Bharatiya Janata Party. Since scenario building is in his Agency’s ambit, General Dhillon needs answering what will happen if this expectation does not materialise. But by then he might perhaps have retired.

Challenging the general’s remarks is important on a more significant count. These were directed at a particularly vulnerable Indian community that also happens to be Muslim, a double whammy in today’s New India. On two prior occasions, the army has had an exchange of words with Muslim politicians, specifically: Asaduddin Owaisi versus northern army commander Devraj Anbu over Muslim ‘martyrs’ and second, Badruddin Ajmal versus Bipin Rawat over the latter’s remarks on the former’s political party. Unless called out, the trend might become a norm, compounding the structural violence against Muslims with cultural violence of this kind. Perpetrators need to be brought down a peg or two, even at the risk of such counters being mischaracterized as ad hominem, lest Muslim bashing becomes a passing fancy for itinerant officials.