https://thekashmirwalla.com/2021/07/kashmirs-militancys-reorganisation-act-post-august-2019/

QUOTED IN RAYAN NAQASH'S 'KASHMIR MILITANCY’S REORGANISATION ACT POST-AUGUST 2019'

 Ali Ahmed, a former infantry officer in the Indian Army who has served in Kashmir and later served as a senior political affairs officer with the UN, said that for Pakistan, Islam had always been “a very useful tool to attract people to go across [to Kashmir] and do mischief. There is money in it and there are volunteers.”

“Its not all about Islam,” Ahmed said. “They may have these terms that sound Arabic but they are not necessarily Islamic. The Hizbul Mujahideen is not necessarily Islamist, they have as much nationalism and sub nationalism and Kashmiri nationalists in it. That [name] maybe a term to perhaps attract money from Pakistan or the Muslim world.”

Outfits like the TRF on the other hand, Ahmed said, “may not attract the funds that are required to keep the whole thing going. So even if there is a [later] reversion to Islamic symbolism that doesn’t necessarily mean Islamism is resurging [unless] if the Islamist energy is diverted to Kashmir by Pakistan.”

Pakistan at the moment is waiting as the events unfold in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal, said Ahmed, adding that these events could “encompass” Kashmir. “If the Indians play hardball, the Pakistanis have got this lever,” he said.

“Then you would need Islamism because it gives you the kind of energy to take on a state as powerful as India. If Islamism has seen the back of the Soviet Union and the United States, it will be possible to think that it will at least tie India down in Kashmir.”

 https://www.claws.in/civilian-faculty-at-professional-military-education-institutions/

Civilian faculty at Professional Military Education institutions

While technical training institutions, as for instance the College of Military Engineering, and pre-commission training institutions, such as the National Defence Academy, have civilian faculty members, the directing staff (DS) at professional military education (PME) institutions is largely uniformed, such as at the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC). At the former set of institutions, civilian staff members and officers of the Army Education Corps teach subjects aligned with the mainstream military professional remit, such as military history, geopolitics etc.

However, there are subjects of professional interest at PME institutions which can be taken on by qualified civilian staff and service veterans, for example strategy, defence policies etc. There are also requirements associated with the award of academic degrees to graduates of PME institutions, the course requirements for which mandate turning in of dissertations, such as for award of a Masters degree at DSSC. Arguably overseeing of such requirements can be better done by civilian faculty members.

Therefore, there is a case for a proportionate civilianizing of the faculty of PME institutions, as the DSSC, War Colleges and National Defence College (NDC), limited to subjects that civilian experts imported from the academia, strategic community and media can address equally competently.

Thus far, exposure to civilian experts at PME institutions has been through a regimen of discrete expert lectures on topics relevant to the military, for instance nuclear deterrence etc. Subjects as strategy are covered by uniformed faculty members, some of whom are earlier graduates of the institution or of equivalent foreign institutions. Such institutions have been well-led, with the commandant appointment being tenanted by renowned names such as Manekshaw, Sundarji, Menon etc. Gauging from the quality and reputation of India’s military leadership, this arrangement has stood the military well so far. The steady stream of students from foreign countries testifies that the standing of these institutions is well deserved. So it is prudent to leave well enough alone and ‘not fix something that ain’t broke’.

Even so, enhancing the scope, content and depth of understanding of higher order subjects that provide a context to the profession of arms is warranted. India is standing on the cusp of greater military responsibilities accruing from its upward power trajectory. It is also staring down adversaries in a two-front situation and taking on key security provider duties on behalf of the international community out of its traditional areas of footprint. It is making the requisite structural changes, for instance going in for theaterisation, associating extensively with militaries of strategic partners, acquiring over-the-horizon capabilities, being on the vanguard of the national bid for self-reliance etc. Alongside, cultural changes are on fast-forward, as a technology orientation and jointness.

Creating a military leadership that can take up the challenges requires innovation. Some measures undertaken so far include increasing the numbers of officers undergoing training at PME institutions. The numbers of foreign officer students have also expanded in keeping with India’s outreach to neighbours, extended neighbourhood and friendly developing countries. The expansion of PME institutions implies a larger DS body, which per force has to come from and at the cost of frontline formations.

Relying on civilian faculty may ease the officer management situation somewhat. Being high profile career officers, instructors are usually off to fill some or other command and staff billet sooner than later. Civilian experts can lend continuity in institutions that otherwise see a rapid turnover in the DS body. They can also take on time-intensive tasks as dissertation supervision, freeing up the DS body to undertake self-development activity standing them in good stead in future leadership positions. Students on course will perhaps access civilians more for academic input, since the perceptual hierarchical barrier will be less obtrusive. The benefit of such interaction is not ones-sided. The civilian staff will also grow as intellectuals, contributing to national strategic culture keeping pace with India’s advance on the world stage.

A mega-step along this direction, the National Defence University (NDU), is pending. In the interim, smaller steps can be taken. Expert civilians can be hired initially as consultants and perhaps with time, as the innovation settles in, as visiting and adjunct faculty. Those already holding down full time jobs can be brought on board on sabbatical, eased by the ministry of education facilitating. A period of quicker turn-over of civilians will get the word out on the military’s inner spaces in the academia. Over time, say by mid-decade, civilian faculty can be hired either through the Union Public Service Commission route or through competitive advertisements on faculty positions as normal in the academia. When the NDU is up and running, an arrangement for inter-posting can be arrived at, to include with defence studies faculties in universities and civilian and military-affiliated think tanks.

In a time of post-covid constrained defence budgets, over the short term, compensation need not necessarily be more than that for consultants hired by ministries these days in the national capital. The novelty of associating with the military can serve as incentive, since the insight from an intimate look can prove useful for cross-fertilisation. Chairs of eminence, as with some think tanks and faculties, can be instituted to attract those with international renown. Temporary scholar-in-residence program for the duration of a course or term can be started.

Fear of security breach or adverse observations from scholars may serve as dampner arguments. The security argument is liable to be overblown since all training institutions work with information in the open domain. Elements in the curriculum of war colleges are confidential, dealing with actual, but protocols attending these can continue in place. As for criticism, the military is no stranger to this and informed criticism is in any case welcome. The military has the mental and public relations social capital to counter it and the moral resources to course correct where necessary.

Civilian faculty inclusion in PME institutions is an idea whose time has come. The national discourse on defence and security is sufficiently advanced, with several universities running security, international relations and peace studies Masters level programs. Veteran officers are increasingly delving into complex subject areas of their earlier professional interest, such as military history. There is thus a plentitude of talent out there, allowing for competition and a quality intake. It can, as bonus, also help lend gender balance to the faculty.

Subject areas where the civilians, including retirees from civil services as defence accounts, can do justice include defence economics, defence industrial sector and policies, military sociology, strategic thinking, Indian strategic discourse, area studies, budget and procurement procedures, organizational management and change, etc.

Professionalism involves a degree of convergence in practices with peer militaries. If and since advanced militaries have long had civilians and military veterans taking classes in PME institutions, can the Indian military afford to lag behind anymore? With the Department of Military Affairs in charge of PME, piloting the idea, allocating the monies, implementing and expanding the scope with time can be easier done. Increasing receptivity to an idea that is certainly not new or original in the government’s privileging of change, encapsulated in the prime minister’s annual address to the military brass, needs exploiting in quick time.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=111521

http://epaper.kashmirtimes.in/index.aspx?page=4 

A peace strategy for Afghanistan

Afghanistan is currently poised at a critical juncture. Apprehensions of a civil war abound in the contestation underway between the government, the Taliban and ethnic militias formed in anticipation of an impending civil war. The deteriorated security situation owes to the earlier than anticipated pace of departure of the United States (US) and its allies, with the former exiting its ‘longest war’.

The uncertainty results from the planned sequence of exit not having materialized. In late February last year, the US had entered into an agreement with the Taliban in which it had promised to leave Afghanistan by 1 May this year, in return for Taliban’s guarantee of securing Afghanistan against any threat to the US from its soil. The Taliban was also to undertake talks with the Afghan government on a ceasefire and the future roadmap for Afghanistan.

In the event, the transition from the Trump to the Biden administration led to the departure date of the US being set back by a few months by Biden, who announced that they would leave by the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 terror attacks, that had prompted their intervention in first place.

The hold up and prospects

For its part, the Taliban has played hard ball and procrastinated on the intra-Afghan talks at Doha that were to have resulted in a ceasefire. It did not turn up for the Istanbul meeting intended to lend momentum to the talks. It has nevertheless stuck to its side of the agreement with the US to talk to the government, there having been two rounds of talks so far – in September last year and in mid June.

The Taliban has indicated that it has a written-out plan that it would be conveying to the government at the next round of talks. The government is amenable to an interim arrangement of sharing power, with elections thereafter. A comprehensive agreement would also require covering a review of the 2004 Constitution, informed by Taliban’s view that the Constitution must reflect Islamic values. To what extent these values will draw on extremist versions of the Sharia is the major concern. The government and its backers would like to preserve the gains made over the past twenty years of peace building, in particular advances in the space for women and protection of minorities.

That the US has been emboldened to depart at a faster pace – best exemplified by its sudden vacation of the Bagram air base -  suggests not so much an indifference on its part to what might follow, but a tactic to get to the two sides – in particular the one it backs, the Afghan government – to get serious on intra-Afghan talks. The Afghan government has been reassured that it and the Afghan military would continue receiving US support, a message conveyed most recently during the visit of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to the US.

The Taliban is reliant on the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and can potentially be influenced by these countries, all of whom are friends of the US. Saudi Arabia is in midst of a makeover from its earlier adherence to puritanical religious norms, and therefore can be expected to help moderate the Taliban.

The other interested regional players – Russia, Iran, China and Central Asian neighbours – have pitched in favour of a peace process and would stay engaged with both the ongoing peacemaking and inevitable peace building to follow. There is a consensus against an Islamist Emirate emerging in Afghanistan, including within Pakistan, the major backer of the Taliban, which cannot but register with the Taliban. Russia recently received a Taliban delegation out to reassure it that the Taliban has turned a new leaf.

A role for the UN?

Some building blocks are in place for managing the aftermath sufficiently to preclude prospects of civil war. The UN has a special political mission in place dating to the implementation phase of the Bonn agreement in late 2001. The mission has been largely engaged with lending coherence to peace building efforts so far.

The UN is no stranger to conflicts in Afghanistan, having assisted with peace processes earlier with special envoys and political missions. The Geneva Accords resulted from some six years of UN engaging with the Soviet Union, the Mujahedeen and parties supportive of the latter. It deployed the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the late eighties to oversee implementation of the agreement.

From 1993 onwards - till 2001 - it had a political mission of support in Afghanistan, interfacing with the belligerents, Taliban and the United Front. Lakhdar Brahimi, who was the personal representative of the secretary general for a time in the period, had been instrumental in an early and positive conclusion to the agreement that emerged in Bonn post 9/11.

The UN has now appointed a special envoy, in preparation for assisting with the peacemaking at the intra-Afghan talks to complement the work of the Gulf States acting as facilitators of the intra-Afghan talks at Doha. This means that the infrastructure for supporting negotiations is in place, as also the UN capability to help implement any agreement that might emerge in the political mission, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), enhancing its peace building role.

Given that the major players are contending militarily, there would be necessity for a military adjunct to  UNAMA. A comprehensive ceasefire arrangement necessarily implies measures for monitoring and dispute settlement, logically entailing third party assistance such as from the United Nations (UN) or a regional organization as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). This may change its current complexion from a political mission to a peacekeeping one.

The SCO has a security role best evidenced from the recent meeting of national security advisers (NSA) of its member states – attended by India’s NSA, Ajit Doval -  that no doubt considered the situation in Afghanistan. It can whistle up either a peacekeeping force or monitors in case an intra-Afghan agreement emerges from Doha.

Implications for India

India, albeit tentatively, stepped up its engagement as the situation has clarified on the US end game in Afghanistan. While it had reluctantly sent two retired diplomats to talks in Moscow in the initial stages of the peace process in 2018, reports from UAE have it that it has met this year with Taliban interlocutors in Dubai.

Though it has denied a meeting of Foreign Minister Jaishankar with Taliban representatives in his recent visit to UAE, a credible outreach at an official level is certainly on since it has attracted derisory attention of no less than the Pakistani national security advisor, who, apropos little, declaimed that India should be ‘ashamed’ of such contacts.

India feels free to engage with the Taliban as the Afghan government is itself in talks with the group. The advantage of such engagement is that India can get a direct feel of the attitude and intention of the Taliban and through the talks can influence it to respect India’s interests and investment in Afghanistan. It could also promise to support the interim arrangement and the elected government that follows with peace building support, incentivizing Taliban to moderate its postures.

Positive fallout of the emerging situation in Afghanistan on the India-Pakistan equation has been the let up in firing on the Line of Control since the late February. Even so, there are dark clouds forming. The apprehension is not so much from Taliban directly, as much from Pakistan. Once its northern flank is secured by Taliban in a power sharing arrangement in Kabul, Pakistan may resume its proxy war in Kashmir.

If the allegations by the two sides – India and Pakistan - are to be believed, then they have just engaged in a tit-for-tat exchange attended by plausible deniability. India has been blamed by Pakistan for the bomb blast in Lahore and Pakistan has been held responsible for the drone attack on Jammu air field. Pakistan has said that the reported contacts between the two sides, that had eased the situation, have since ceased.

India has two strategic options: one, fuel the Afghan civil war through a proxy war in Afghanistan with Pakistan and thereby keep Pakistan bogged down; or, two, lend its shoulder to the peace process in Afghanistan. The former is hardly a friendly gesture by an avowed friend of the Afghan people that is India. While the latter seemingly favours Taliban and, in turn, its backer Pakistan, it is a collaborative approach can see ripple effects in Kashmir.

Way ahead

Even though Taliban claims to have take 85 per cent of the area, civil war is not inevitable. Action must not be taken making civil war a self-fulfilling prophecy. Instead, mediation support should be enhanced. The current period of instability must be reframed as one in which the contending sides are last-minute trying to get to a position of strength, a typical pre-negotiation strategy.

Viewed thus, there is scope for military support of the government to hold its own. India has trained over 100 Afghan officers every year at its commissioning academies since its strategic partnership agreement in 2011. Holding the Ghani government’s hand will redress any asymmetry, making it clear to Taliban that it cannot take on the battle field what it can instead get on the negotiation table.

The Indian foreign minister has rightly held that legitimacy is a concern today. The ‘secret’ visit of the head of the Afghan High Peace Council, Abdullah Abdullah, to Delhi implies a role in returning sustaining peace for India. This can be by helping reduce the asymmetry on the negotiation table against the Afghan government.

To assume such a role, India must display self-confidence in its soft power to influence the Taliban to settle with the Afghan government and in its hard power to negate any consequences on Kashmir. The Afghan end game provides an opportunity for collaboration between India and Pakistan (and, indeed, also China) on restoring sustainable peace.

The building blocks for peace are already in place: peacemaking facilitation by the Gulf States supported by the UN; all actors on standby for peace building assistance coordinated by the UN; and ceasefire monitoring peacekeeping forces easily whistled up  on culmination of Doha talks.  

 

 

 

 

 

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[1] The author thanks the Nelson Mandela Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, for the opportunity of a lecture at which he made the observations in the article.

 http://jmi.ac.in/hn/upload/publication/pr1_English_2021July7.pdf

July 7, 2021 

Press Release 

JMI organises Extension Lecture on "Current Juncture in the Afghan Peace Process: An Appraisal from the Lenses of Peace Theory” 

The Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (NMCPCR) organised a virtual Extension Lecture on July 6, 2021. The theme of the Extension Lecture was "Current Juncture in the Afghan Peace Process: An Appraisal from the Lenses of Peace Theory". The keynote speaker was Dr. Ali Ahmed.. He has been a United Nations Official, Academic and Retired Infantry Officer of the Indian Army. Prof. Kaushikee, Honorary Director, NMCPCR welcomed the speaker and all the participants. She also briefly introduced the speaker.

 

Dr. Ahmed began his lecture by highlighting two important issues: that the current juncture in the Afghan Peace Process is to be understood in the backdrop of the pullout of US troops from Afghanistan. Secondly, the terms of the ongoing Afghan peace process are primarily based on the Taliban’s undertaking to not allow the Afghan territory to be used against US interests and that the US will proceed to exit from Afghanistan by September 2021. He mentioned that the implementation of the peace agreement reached between the Taliban and the US government in February 2020 is currently underway and there is a three-way contest going on within Afghanistan between the Afghan government, the Taliban and the ethnic and local militias which may lead to civil war in the future if not handled carefully.

 

In the second part of his lecture, the speaker focused on the Peace Theories and Models such as the Hour glass model, the Agenda for Peace framework etc. He then gave a snippet view of the Afghan Peace Process and emphasized in detail on the peacemaking and peace-building aspects. As part of the peacemaking initiatives, he spoke about the Geneva Accords, the UN Support Mission in Afghanistan, the Bonn International Conferences, the efforts made by the Obama and the Trump administration, culminating in the peace deal arrived at in Doha in February 2020.

 

Dr. Ahmed was optimistic about the prospects of peacemaking in Afghanistan. He emphasized that the initiative at this juncture is dependent on the condition set by the Taliban that they would engage in talks with the Afghan government once the US and its allies have left Afghanistan. He maintained that by engaging with the Taliban it may be influenced to be more moderate especially with respect to human rights in Afghanistan. The speaker was hopeful that from the Peace Theory perspective, it would be beneficial to continue talking to the Taliban as this may result in a political solution.

 

Speaking about peace-building, the speaker highlighted some of the major issues like credible elections, a likely review of the Constitution especially in relation to the question of women’s rights, minority rights etc., the Security Sector Reforms, the implementation of Rule of Law, interim arrangements before holding elections and transitional justice mechanisms and last but not the least the critical issue of development. He concluded by saying that military solutions have limited efficacy and it is important to go in for a political resolution by engaging with all the stakeholders through negotiation and dialogue. He was appreciative of India’s recently reported outreach to the Taliban.

 

The lecture was followed by an engaging Q and A session wherein students and participants raised several critical questions. The event concluded with a proposal of a vote of thanks by the Honorary Director. The lecture was attended by faculty members, students and research scholars of the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, and by students of other centres  and departments of JMI.